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A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
WORLD OF WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY
AEF KAisxt

"History sets us free and enables us to make up our minds dis-

passionately ...

"
-OLIvER

N THE MANNER OF A CRAFTSMAN

WENDELL HOLm-ES, JR.

removing the gloss of later genera-

tions from an old masterpiece, William Winslow Crosskey has
sought in Politics and the Constitution' to recapture the "historic and
intended" meaning of the nation's organic charter. This is an extraordinary book, boldly original and revolutionary in its implications. If
Crosskey is right-and he adduces an enormous mass of supporting
evidence-the historical meaning of the Constitution is generally unknown and much that passes as Constitutional Law is in fact unconstitutional. Politics and he Constitution is moreover not merely a treatise on
law; it is an absorbing account in history and government by a perceptive
student of human affairs.
The central thesis of this work is that the scheme of power intended to
be established by the Constitution between the nation and the states has
been largely misunderstood. The first principle of orthodox constitutional
law is that the Constitutional Convention intended to create a national
government of limited, enumerated powers. But Crosskey contends the
Constitution was designed to establish a national government completely
empowered to attain all of the objects recited in the preamble. Congress
was intended to have general, not merely a limited, legislative authority
to pass all laws necessary and proper in its judgment for the general welt Member of the District of Columbia Bar.
I Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States
(1953) (hereafter cited only by chapter or page).
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fare and the common defense. The Supreme Court was intended to be-

come the juridical head of a unified national system of administering
justice, supreme in all matters over both federal and state courts. The
President was granted general executive power to insure domestic
tranquility. The states were 'to have a subordinate and limited role.
Crosskey challenges one accepted dogma after another. He concludes that
Congress was intended to possess authority to regulate intrastate commerce; that the Supreme Court was never intended to have power generally to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional; that nearly all of the
Bill of Rights were originally intended to apply both to the nation and
the states. Clauses whose meaning has hitherto been obscure-the Full
Faith and Credit Clause; the time, place and manner provision; the Imports and Exports Clause; the ex post facto prohibitions-emerge in a
new light. Historical events and personalities appear in a fresh perspective.
The problem he sets out to answer is this: How was the Constitution
understood by an intelligent, well informed person when the document
was drafted in 1787? The first principle of his methodology is Holmes'
oft-quoted rule of documentary interpretation: "We ask, not what this
man meant, but what those words would mean in the mouth of a normal
speaker of English using them in the circumstances in which they were
used. 12 He has sought to "accumulate in the mind of the reader the same
apperceptive mass of factual knowledge which would have been possessed
by an intelligent and well informed mind of 1787." In order to do so, he
made an exhaustive survey of the eighteenth century American newspapers, pamphlets, public documents, correspondence and the like. He has
succeeded in vividly recreating the "circumstances" in which the Constitution was written-the politics and economics, the law and language of
the time. The Constitution is written in the idiom of the eighteenth century. "One is prone to assume that, when words abide, meanings remain;
yet some 15 decades of cultural change-and their restless impact upon
4
language-lie between us and the words of the Constitution." With
painstaking care, Crosskey has reconstructed the locution of 1787. Applying the word-meanings of that period, he shows that the Constitution was
an internally consistent, carefully constructed document.
If he is right, how have the many misconceptions arisen? The causes, in
his view, are multiplex. Failure by Congress to exercise many of its powers
in the early years of the government and the geographic inaccessibility of
2p. ii.

3P.

12.

' Hamilton and Adair, The Power to Govern 42](1937).
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the Supreme Court led to a paucity of precedents. Deliberate distortion to
facilitate attainment of desired political ends was one factor. Thus, the
slavery issue led to the mutilation of one clause after another because the
South feared a generally empowered national government dominated by
Northerners. But the principal sources of misunderstanding have been
fortuitous changes in legal and political ideas and particularly in the usage
of certain key words.
Crosskey believes that orthodox historians have been misled, in part by
failure to grasp eighteenth century idiom, and in part by uncritical acceptance of certain source material. The principal authority to whom
many historians have traditionally turned for evidence respecting the
meaning of the Constitution is James Madison. Crosskey shows Madison
to be a highly unreliable witness who was not above wilful distortion. He
believes that still other traditional sources-particularly The Federalisthave been misunderstood. In the manner of Descartes, Crosskey begins
by suspending judgment on all accepted historical views and he independently re-examines all of the evidence respecting the history and
evolution of the Constitution.
This article is intended to summarize briefly Crosskey's principal conclusions and to indicate his main points of departure from orthodox constitutional law. To compress a closely-reasoned 1410-page treatise within
the compass of a law review article inevitably results in serious omission.
Crosskey spreads before the reader all of the evidence upon which he
relies. He explores exhaustively every alternative hypothesis. Abstracted
from context, his conclusions will strike the initiated in this field as
startling and difficult to credit. It seems useful, nevertheless, to present
this capsulated statement of Crosskey's views with the thought that it
may encourage examination of the work itself and furnish a helpful background for the discussions of the book in this number of the Review.
I
Crosskey begins by examining the most important of the non-military
powers of Congress-its authority over commerce. He believes that once
the intended plenary scope of the Commerce Clause is understood, the
thesis that Congress was designed to have general legislative power will
become more intelligible and credible. The power is granted in these
terms: "The Congress shall have Power... to regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes." The Supreme Court interprets the word "states" in this clause
to mean the "territorial divisions of the country." "Commerce . .
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among the several States" is thus "commerce from the territory of one of
our states to that of another," an idea subsumed in the phrase "interstate
commerce." Since all activity involving no movement beyond the borders
of a single state is excluded, congressional power over the nation's business
is theoretically incomplete.
In practice, Congress has enacted, and the Supreme Court has sustained, many laws relating to "intrastate" commerce. Congress, it is said,
may act upon intrastate activity which "substantially affects" interstate
commerce. But the theoretical "interstate" limitation is by no means
academic, as recent Supreme Court cases attest.' Because the power of
Congress is thought to be incomplete, case after case arises in which the
issue is whether national or state law is applicable. Parties are forced to
gamble in prognosticating the proper law. Effective governmental regulation is often stymied. Moreover, under the interstate theory Congress is
thought to lack the constitutional competence to enact nationwide uniform commercial law, applicable to all gainful activity, interstate and
intrastate.6 Yet, it is as true today as it was in 1801 that "to have a
contract of a pagticular form negotiable in one State while it is not so in
another, is nonsense."' The interstate theory has also contributed to the
absence of a national uniform corporations act. Regulation of vast industrial empires has been left in many particulars to the states, and, as
Crosskey observes, some businessmen have played off one state against
another, debasing corporate law in the process.
Restrictive interpretations of the commerce power by the Supreme
Court in the early years of the New Deal spurred efforts to discover a
different meaning for the clause. It was suggested that "among" meant to
"concern more than one of" the several states, so that Congress could
8
regulate such intra-state commerce as "concerned" more states than one.
6Whether or not a particular activity was interstate commerce was a central issue in Lorain
Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951), a Sherman Act proceeding, and Alstate
Const. Co. v. Durkin, 345 U.S. 13 (1953), a Fair Labor Standards Act suit. Examination of
the Federal Digest will show that the question recurs continually.
6Though uniform commercial law is widely desired, it is now clear that it cannot be secured
through independent state action. The Uniform Sales Act, one of the basic uniform laws, was
first proposed in 1906 but has been adopted in only thirty-four states, and even as between
these, it is non-uniform. Unless enacted by Congress and made applicable to all gainful activity,
interstate and intrastate, there is small likelihood that the new Uniform Commercial Code,
proposed by the American Law Institute, will produce uniformity, since the text, as adopted,
will doubtless vary from state to state, and it will in time be interpreted differently by the various state supreme courts.
7 Sullivan, History of Land Titles in Massachusetts 353 (1801), quoted in Crosskey, p. 36.
8

Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1335

(1934).
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In 1937, Hamilton and Adair published a short study presenting evidence
that "commerce" in 1787 was the "name for the economic order" and the
"only word which could catch up into a single comprehensive term
all
activities directly affecting the wealth of the nation." 9 But even if commerce comprehended the wages of labor and the business of mining, as
Hamilton and Adair urged, the assumed interstate limitation would have
precluded effective national regulation.
Crosskey's conclusion, backed by exhaustive documentation, is that
the word "States" in the Commerce Clause was understood when the
Constitution was written to refer to the "people of the states" and the
term "Commerce" comprehended "all gainful activity." The clause was
understood as a "simple and exhaustive catalogue of all the different
kinds of commerce to which the people of the United States had access:
commerce, that is, with the people of foreign nations, commerce with the
people of the Indian tribes, and commerce among the people of the several
states."' 0 Congress was given the power, he concludes, to "govern
generallj every species of gainful activity carried on by Americans" and
was intended to have a "complete, not a fragmentary power." Limitations
of space permit only an outline of the argument."
1) The word "States" occurs in the Commerce Clause between two
nouns, "Nations" and "Tribes," understood in 1787, as they are today, in
many contexts, in a multitudinal sense. The "French nation" commonly
means the people of France. To interpret "States," as the Supreme Court
does, to mean the "territory of a state" results in an unidiomatic meaning
for "among," which is ordinarily used to denote movement from one to
another of a group of persons and not movement from one to another
of a group of places.12 The most common meaning of "State" in 1787,
was in the sense of the "people of a state," a still legitimate, but not
9Hamilton and

Adair, The Power to Govern 62--63 (1937).

10P.77.

n The Commerce Clause argument comprises the first eight chapters of the book after the
introduction. Chapter II is a statement of the evil practical consequences of the interstate
theory; Chapter M is intended to prove the correct meaning of the word "States" in the
Commerce Clause; and Chapters IV-IX are designed to establish that the phrase "To regulate Commerce" was understood before and after the federal convention in a comprehensive
sense.
12Crosskey gives this example (p. 51): "[Tit is possible to speak either of 'a constant correspondence among the members of a Congressional committee during an adjournment of Congress,' or of 'a constant correspondence between the members'. ... Yet, because of the difference in usage between 'between' and 'among,' it would not be said that the correspondence
carried on by such a committee would give rise to 'an increase in the postal traffic among the
different places where the members were.' It would be said, instead, that their correspondence
would give rise to 'an increase in the postal traffic between those places.'"
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common, usage today. Crosskey has assembled a great many examples of
such usage from the newspapers, treatises, correspondence, and the like of
that period. The most striking evidence of word habits was the use of
plural verbs and pronouns with the word "state," as in the sentences, "the
state of New-York are able to supply themselves with a sufficient quantity
of that useful article xALS" or "the state of Pennsylvania have justly considered themselves as holding the balance between the southern and
northern interests."' 3 "State," in the foregoing examples, which were
common locution, clearly means the "people" of New York and Pennsylvania. Similarly, Alexander Hamilton and others interpreted the Electionof-Electors Clause, which provides that "each State shall appoint ['Electors'] in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct," as vesting
the right of selecting presidential electors in the people. 14 Eighteenth century theories of politics emphasized the societal sense of the word. The
"state" was thought to have originated from a compact among men living
in a state of nature who determined to form themselves into "civil
societies."' 5

2) "Commerce" in the Eighteenth Century had a variety of meanings.' At first blush, its many meanings would seem to preclude a precise
sense for the term in the Commerce Clause. But variations in the meaning
of the same word without attendant confusion are a commonplace. Meaning depends upon context. To invoke Crosskey's example, the word
"animal" in "animal kingdom," "animal hospitals," and "the birds and
animals at the zoo," has a different meaning in each phrase, but the
meaning is plain when the phrases are considered as wholes. As proof that
the phrase "To regulate Commerce" had a single and well understood
meaning, Crosskey examines in detail three principal items of evidence
from the pre-federal convention period: (a) the widely-circulated Letters
from a Farmer in Pennsylvania, published in 1767 by John Dickinson, a
leading Revolutionary pamphleteer and later a prominent member of
18 P. 61; see pp. 60-65.
14Pp. 67-68.
Is Crosskey concludes that no competent lawyer in 1787 would have read "Commerce
among the several States" as "commerce between citizens of different states, only" (p. 80).
He contrasts the language of the judiciary article which extends the judicial power "to Controversies... between Citizens of different States." Just as a power to regulate homicide
among the Indian tribes would be understood to extend to inter-tribal and intra-tribal murders,
so would a power to regulate commerce among the several states have been understood to
apply to commerce between the citizens of each state considered singly as well as between
citizens of different states. See also pp. 80-82, 214-15,
IV,
is .P.
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the Continental Congress and the Federal Convention;17 (b) certain
extant papers of James Duane, delegate to the First Continental Congress
from the Colony of New York, which relate to the proceedings in Congress leading to the adoption on October 14, 1774, of the Resolutions on
the Rights and Grievances of the Colonies ;18 (c) discussions in the newspapers of the country in 1777-1780 evoked by attempts to fix wages and
prices, inflated by the Revolution, through uniform state action. 9
As evidence that the commerce clause was understood in an inclusive
sense at the time of adoption and in the early years of the government,
Crosskey considers briefly the ratification campaign, 20 and he examines in
detail the 1791 discussion respecting the bill to establish the Bank of the
United States, 21 the internal improvement debates of 1817 and 1823,2 and
the New York steamboat monopoly controversy. 23
The bank bill excited extensive discussion of the Commerce Clause.
Crosskey contrasts Madison's contention that the bill to incorporate the
bank had nothing to do with trade with his assertion only a year earlier
that Congress possessed the power "generally, to regulatethe mode in which
every species of business sl[ould] be transacted.' 24 The bank bill was attacked on many grounds, but neither in the Congressional debates nor in
the pamphlet and newspaper discussions of the time was there any suggestion that the bill was void as a commercial regulation because it pertained not only to foreign and interstate trade but to the state's internal
or intrastate commerce as well.
It was not until 1824 that the first Commerce Clause case, Gibbons v.
7
7 C. V. Dickinson's usage in the "Letters" indicates clearly that he understood the phrase
"to regulate trade" to comprehend all of the colonies' gainful activities. "Trade" and "commerce" were then interchangeable terms.
18
C. VI. Crosskey's analysis of the Duane papers is designed to demonstrate the incorrectness of the assumption held by a number of historians (see p. 1298 n. 1) that a power of
"regulating trade" or "commerce" was understood in the Eighteenth Century to refer to
"external commerce only." Crosskey explains that, though the phrase "to regulate commerce" covered all of the colonies' gainful activities, the politics of the Revolution which led
the colonists to concede to Parliament only a power over external or foreign trade, required
that all aspects of the commerce power be particularized in the Constitution.
19 C. VII. The newspaper discussions indicate that only a short time before the commerce
clause was drawn there was a common understanding that a power to regulate commerce comprehended every branch of the internal business of the country. By way of example, a Massachusetts act which undertook to fix "the price of farming labour," "the price of the labour of
mechanics and tradesmen," and "other labour"; prices of farm products, local manufactures
and other activities was characterized in a Boston newspaper as a "legislative regulation of
commerce." Opponents of wage and price legislation spoke of "the vain project of supporting
the credit of fictitious wealth, by a general regulation of commerce."
20
Pp. 187-92. Detailed discussion of the ratification has been deferred to a future volume.
21Pp. 192-228.
23 Ibid.
24
22C. IX.
Pp. 193, 203.
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Ogden,25 reached the Supreme Court. The conventional view is that Chief
Justice Marshall there interpreted "commerce among the several states"
to mean "inter-state comm.erce," a phrase Marshall did not employ.
Three years earlier, in Cohens v. Virginia,26 Marshall had declared in
sweeping terms that "[fln all commercial regulations we are one and the
same people," and that as to "all commercial regulations," the power of
the national government "is complete."27 Crosskey suggests that Marshall
was compelled by his states-rights colleagues on the Court to retreat in
some measure from these views but that, read carefully, Gibbons v. Ogden
does not support the interstate theory. His masterful analysis of that
opinion should be read entire. Shortly after Gibbons v. Ogden, the highest
court in New York of the time said that it was not thought in 1789 that
"the coasting trade or commerce among the several states must consist of
voyages from state to state only. That was the discovery of later times.
that commerce among the states meant among the
[But] it was then thought
28
states."
the
people of
II
Distortions in the intended meaning of three provisions which limit
state power-the Imports and Exports Clause,2 9 the prohibition of ex

post facto laws, 30 and the Contracts Clause31-have, in Crosskey's view,
obscured the true meaning of the Commerce Clause.
1) The accepted view is that the Imports and Exports Clause forbids
the states from levying certain taxes upon goods brought from or destined
to foreign countries.3 2 Crosskey shows that when the clause was drawn,
"imports" and "exports" were understood to refer to the movement of
goods from state to state as well as to the designation of things brought in
29 Wheat. (U.S.) 208 (1824).

26 Wheat. (U.S.) 264 (1821).
17 Pp. 413-414 (emphasis supplied).
28North River Steamboat Co. v. Livingston, 1 Hopk. (N.Y. Ch.) 149 (1824). For Crosskey's
discussion of the case, see pp. 268-80.
29 "No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay, any Imposts or Duties on
Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws:
and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports and Exports,
shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject
to the Revision and the Controul of the Congress." U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 10, 1 2.
30 U.S. Const., Art. 1, § 10, provides that "No State shall... pass any... ex post facto
Law, . . ." § 9 contains a similarly worded prohibition applicable to Congress.
31U.S. Const., Art. 1, § 10: "No State shall... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, ... "
3Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. (U.S.) 123 (1868); Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.S.
506, 510-11 (1923).
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from abroad or sent to foreign nations.3 3 So, for example, a Rhode Island
newspaper referred to flour "U]ust [ilmported... from Philadelphia"and
a Connecticut writer urged the manufacture of stockings in that state
"for exportation to other States. ' 34 Moreover, the "duties" which the
clause prohibits comprehend all taxes, including retail excises and excepting only general property taxes. It follows that the clause was designed to
forbid virtually all state exactions upon interstate and foreign imports
and exports. The clause was so understood and applied by the Supreme
Court until the Civil War. 5
The accepted theory for dealing with interstate tax barriers is among
the most casuistic in all constitutional law. It is said that the Commerce
Clause "by its own force created an area of trade free from interference by
the States.

'3

6

The Court, in other words, relies upon the Commerce

Clause to invalidate state taxes which interfere with the free flow of
interstate trade. The structure of the Constitution, however, precludes
the assumption that a grant of power to Congress by itself limits state
power.37 Why, for example, when Congress was given power to coin
money, was it deemed necessary expressly to prohibit the states from
coining money? Moreover, if an implied state disability to tax interstate
commerce flows from an assumed grant to Congress of an interstate
commerce power, why, Crosskey asks, would not a comparable disability
to tax foreign commerce spring from the grant to Congress of a power
over "commerce with foreign nations," thereby rendering the Imports
and Exports Clause, as presently interpreted, totally unnecessary? The
Supreme Court's theory of an implied state disability to tax interstate
commerce logically requires a corresponding interstate commerce power,
thereby reinforcing misunderstanding concerning the Commerce Clause.
Were Crosskey's views accepted, the Supreme Court would have a respectable intellectual footing from which to strike down state attempts,
which have steadily increased in number, to erect tax systems obstructing
the free flow of goods.
2) The Supreme Court interprets the Ex post facto Clauses as pro"C.X.
34P.298.
,5See p. 314.
" Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1947).
37Justice Frankfurter, who is now one of the leading exponents of the negative
implication doctrine, recognized before coming to the Court that "The conception that the mere grant
of commerce power to Congress dislodged state power finds no expression" in "the Philadelphia Convention nor the discussions preceding ratification of its labors.. . ." Frankfurter,
The Commerce Clause 12-13 (1937).
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hibiting retroactive criminal statutes only. 35 Crosskey demonstrates that
when the Constitution was drawn the clauses were understood to forbid
39
all retroactive laws, civil as well as criminal. The phrase occurred repeatedly in reference to the notorious state debtor-relief acts of the preconvention period. The orthodox view is that various state laws retroactively altering the obligations of debtors were intended to be forbidden
by the Contracts Clause.4" That clause is thus read to forbid state laws
which "impair the obligation of contracts" previously formed. But if
Crosskey's analysis of the Rx post facto Clause is correct, the Contracts
Clause, as usually interpreted, would be superfluous; the subjects which
the Contracts Clause is thought to cover would be within the prohibition of ex post facto civil laws, of which laws impairing the obligation of
contracts previously fornfed would be an example. In Crosskey's view,
the Contracts Clause means what it literally says: it prohibits the impairment of the obligation of contracts, whether the contracts were
previously formed or not. 41 By "obligation of contracts" was meant all of
a state's laws relating to contracts, and any state law which subsequent
to the date of the Constitution diminished the totality of enforceable
obligations would violate the clause. By way of example, if before the
Constitution a state did not have a statute of frauds rendering unenforceable oral agreements above a specified amount, the state could not subsequent to the Constitution pass such a law. On the other hand, a state law
abolishing the requirements for consideration would not impair obligation
of contracts; it would increase the quantum of enforceable obligations.
As customarily understood, the Contracts Clause, in Crosskey's phrase,
is "undeniably a queer provision." The usual view is that the clause was
inserted to forbid state acts deemed unfair. But if retrospective impairments were forbidden as unfair, why was the equally unfair retrospective
creation of contracts not precluded? There is no provision corresponding
to the Contracts Clause applicable to Congress. But if the impairment of
38 Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. (U.S.) 386 (1798); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594

(1952).
31The decision of the Supreme Court in Calder v. Bull, 3 DalU. (U.S.) 386 (1798), restricting
the clause to criminal matters was motivated, Crosskey suggests, by the desire to free Congress to enact a bankruptcy law that would afford relief to preexisting debtors, among whom
were Robert Morris, "the financier" of the Revolution, who was then in debtor's prison, and
James Wilson, an Associate Justice, who had been sent out on circuit to avoid imprisonment
for debt. Opponents of the retroactive bankruptcy law argued that Congress was forbidden to
pass such an act because of the Ex post facto Clause applicable to Congress. By narrowing
the clause as applied to the states, the Court paved the way for federal bankruptcy relief to
preexisting debtors. The decision was questioned for many years. Pp. 349-51.
40See Corwin, The Constitution and What It Means Today 77 (10th ed., 1948).
4
C. XII.
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contracts by the states is deemed unfair, why were not equally unfair
impairments by Congress in interstate and foreign commerce forbidden?
Crosskey's answer is that the Contracts Clause was inserted to make
exclusive Congressional power over contracts and not to forbid the doing
of unfair acts.
Crosskey's interpretation of the Contracts and Ex post facto Clauses
furnishes evidence from the Constitution itself that the Commerce Clause
was intended to be plenary. If, as he concludes, the states were forbidden
by the Contracts Clause to restrict future intrastate contractual obligations, and if Congress possessed only interstate commerce power, as the
Supreme Court holds, there would be no governmental agency, federal or
state, with power over intrastate contracts. Such a gap in a scheme of
governmental regulation is anomalous. It is conceivable that there was a
blunder in draftsmanship. But Crosskey's documentation and the logical
interrelationship of the provisions as he reads them is powerful proof that
such was not the case. If the Commerce Clause is understood in a comprehensive sense, the problem vanishes.
III
Crosskey maintains, contrary to orthodox views, that Congress was
intended to be vested with general legislative authority to pass all laws
necessary and proper for the general welfare and the common defense.
Moreover, as among the different branches of the government, Congress
was intended to be supreme. The Eighteenth Century believed in legislative supremacy. As James Otis put it in 1764: "[T]here can be but one
supreme power which is the legislative, to which all the rest are and must be
' 42
subordinate.
General legislative power resulted in the first instance from the preamble which is conventionally thought to be nothing but a "verbal
flourish." He shows that the preamble was in fact carefully constructed,
and that under eighteenth century rules of documentary interpretation
there resulted from the preambular statement of the government's ob4 Otis, The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved 33 (1764). Compare 1 B1.
Comm. 49 (Cooley's 3d rev. ed., 1884): "... . all the other powers of the state must obey the
legislative power in the discharge of their several functions, or else the constitution is at an
end."
Legislative supremacy was conferred in the Constitution, according to Crosskey, by the
grant to Congress of "all" legislative power, U.S. Const-, Art. 1, § 1; from the grant to Congress of a power to enact all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution its own
powers and all other powers vested in the government or any department thereof, ibid., § 8;
and from the supremacy clause, ibid., Art. 6, § 2, which makes the laws, which only Congress
can enact, a part of "the supreme Law of the Land," a status significantly not accorded acts
of the President or decisions of the courts.
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jects, powers fully adequate to attain all of those objects. All of the
legislative aspects of such powers were vested in Congress.
A general, substantive power was granted in his view by the introductory clause to Section 8 of Article 1, which provides that "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Exoises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and gen-

eral Welfare of the United States; .. ." He interprets this clause as con-

ferring a power to tax, a power to pay the debts, and a separate, substantive power to provide for the common defense and the general welfare. 44 The Supreme Court construes this clause as if it read: "Congress
the debts and
shall have power to lay and collect taxes [in order] to pay
45
welfare.
general
provide for the common defense and
General legislative power had still a third source, namely the relation46
ship between Congress and the judiciary. In the 18th Century, a legislature was deemed to have the power to enact "rules of decision" for the
courts in all cases. Crosskey concludes that contrary to long-accepted
views, the English common law as applicable to American conditions and
the acts of Parliament in amendment thereof was the general, basic
4
customary law of the American colonies in 1787. 7 There was no separate,
developed body of state common law; indeed there were no state law
reports before 1789. Since this nationwide common law was one of the
"Laws of the United States" within the meaning of Section 2 of the
judiciary article, 48 the jurisdiction of the federal courts would have extended to all cases arising under the general common law. The questions
to which the common law relates are of course comprehensive in scope.
And because the state courts were in Crosskey's view intended to be
completely subordinate to the federal judiciary, as to which Congress had
power to make "rules of decision," Congressional authoity would have
been commensurate with the plenitude of the common law. The premise
that the common law was one of the laws of the United States is one of
his central operative hypotheses; but he shows that the judicial rule-mak43Pp. 374-79.

4 Corwin, op. cit. supra note 40, at 28-29.

44Pp. 393-401.

- Pp. 557-62.

47 C. XIX.
4

8 "The judicial power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority... ." U.S. Const. Art. 3, § 2. Though one of the "laws of the United States"
within the meaning of the judiciary article, the common law, Crosskey concludes, was not
part of the supreme law under the supremacy clause, i.e., the common law was not a law
"which shall be made" by Congress. See note 71 infra. If the common law had been accorded a
constitutional supremacy status, it would have been inalterable by state legislation.
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ing power of Congress would exist in the same scope, whether this view
were taken or not.
The oft-voiced objection to the thesis that Congress was granted a
separate, substantive power to provide for the common defense and the
general welfare is that the enumeration of powers in Section 8 of Article 1
would then be purposeless. The Tenth Amendment is advanced as decisive
proof that Congress was not granted such authority. It thus becomes
incumbent to establish that, even if Congress were given general legislative authority, the enumeration was nonetheless required, and the Tenth
Amendment did not undo the Philadelphia Convention's labors. Crosskey
traces the pre-convention history of each provision enumerated; he accounts even for the precise phrasing of many clauses; he pinpoints the
unsatisfactory character of present-day explanations; and he demonstrates why it was necessary to enumerate each clause notwithstanding a
49
general grant of legislative power.
The accepted theory is that the powers of Congress were enumerated in
order to make plain which powers Congress should possess as against the
states and, by negative implication, those powers it should not possess.
In Crosskey's view, this factor was operative only in a few cases. The
reasons for the enumeration were varied, but would have been intelligible
to anyone in 1787 conversant with the politics and a "best seller" of that
day, Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England.
A general grant of executive, judicial, and legislative power to the
president, the judiciary, and Congress, would not have sufficed, since the
convention wished to transfer to Congress many powers which were of an
executive character under the standing law-namely, the English common
law, which was the law of the colonies. Most of the powers of Congress
enumerated in Section 8 of Article 1 were powers which, under the common law, belonged to the King of England in his executive capacity, and
if such powers had not been enumerated as powers of Congress, they
would have been understood to belong under the Constitution to the chief
executive. A comparison of Blackstone's chapter on the "Royal Prerogative" branch of the common law with the enumeration of powers in Section
8 is highly revealing: power after power transferred to Congress is described by Blackstone, almost in the exact terms employed in the Constitution, as a power of the king. Nearly all the military powers of Congress were of this order. The penetrating insight that the powers of
Congress in Section 8 were primarily enumerated to allocate powers to
41 For

Crosskey's explanation of the enumeration, see cc. XV-XVII.
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Congress that would otherwise have belonged to the President enables
Crosskey to account for nineteen of the twenty-nine powers therein
enumerated.
Still other clauses in Section 8 were enumerated to express limitations
upon Congress. By way of illustration, the grant of power to establish "a
uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies" was designed to blot out private or non-uniform acts of
naturalization and bankruptcy. Other powers were enumerated for
political reasons or for purpose of emphasis and clarification. Thus,
enumeration of a power to tax would have been necessary notwithstanding
a general grant of legislative authority because in the. dispute with England a general regulatory power had always been distinguished from a
power to tax, and for the further reason that absence of a taxing power
was one of the chief defects of the Articles of Confederation. Still other
powers were enumerated because they had belonged to the Continental
Congress and nonenumeration in the Constitution would have permitted
0
the argument that Congress was not to possess those powers.
His analyses of two clauses-the Time, Place, and Manner Clause and
the Full Faith and Credit proviso-are of unusual interest, both because
of light shed on provisions whose meaning has hitherto been unknown and
because of the intrinsic importance of the subjects. It is customarily
thought that, subject to the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments, the
Constitution confides in the states the power to determine who shall vote
for Senators and Representatives to Congress. But Congress is given
power by Section 4 of Article 1 to prescribe the "'Mannerof holding Elections for Senators and Representatives." Crosskey demonstrates that the
word "Manner" employed in connection with elections was commonly
5
understood in 1787 to refer to the identity or qualification s of voters. ' To
determine the "Manner" of voting was to decide "who" would vote. The
supporting evidence is extensive. Pursuant to this power, Congress could
abolish state poll taxes or enact uniform nationwide legislation fixing age
and other qualifications for participation in various state and federal
elections. 2
t0 Crosskey's explanation of the enumeration is not an arid legal analysis. His treatment of
the Piracy Clause includes a short but absorbing survey of the punishment of sea bandits in
England and the colonies from 1400 until 1787. Pp. 443-52. In explaining the reason for the
enumeration of the Copyright Clause-to limit the power of Congress to grant perpetual
copyrights-he discusses the history of the printing monopoly from its inception in Tudor
England, and he traces the long struggle by authors to protect their intellectual product
against exploitation. Pp. 477-86.
5
1The subject of voting in the Constitution is discussed by Crosskey, pp. 522-41.
5 Congress was also given substantial power over state governments, according to Crosskey, by Article 4 which provides that the "United States shall guarantee to every state... a
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Crosskey's examination of the Full Faith and Credit Clause discloses
eighteenth century notions of jurisprudence in rdvance of current
thought."3 Section 1 of Article 4 provides that "Full Faith and Credit
shall be given in each State to the Public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State." This clause was intended, according to
Crosskey, to enable establishment of a nationally uniform system of interstate conflict of law rules. By "public Acts" were meant the acts of the
state legislature as distinguished from acts of the Courts and the executive, and, moreover, only "public" as contrasted with "private" legislative acts. "Judicial proceedings" referred to the judgments and decrees of
state courts. "Records," he shows, was the eighteenth century term for
judicial precedents. Modernized, the clause would read: "Such effect shall
be given in each state to the legislation, judicial precedents, and court
judgments and decrees of every other state, as will answer, in every respect, to what is required by the rules and principles of the conflict of
laws." Contrary to Crosskey's view, the Supreme Court holds that the
"full faith and credit clause is not an inexorable or unqualified command."' 4 As a result, judgments do not of necessity have the same status
in other states as in the state where rendered; there is apparently no requirement that a state give effect in an applicable case to the precedents of
another state, since the Court does not appear to recognize the true
meaning of "records"; and the statutes of another state are frequently
displaced by the forum's own law. Moreover, instead of nationwide uniformity, conflict rules are deemed to be part of the "local" law of each
state.s
What of the Tenth Amendment? It provides that "The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
"Delegated" is assumed to have been used in the sense of "vested" and
"reserved" in the sense of "retained."" The amendment is thus thought to
Republican form of Government, . . ." Republican government is representative government
and the representative character of government depends upon a wide distribution of suffrage.
Pp. 522-24. Pursuant to thisclause, Congress would pass laws wiping out the "rotten boroughs"
that exist in some states.
53Pp. 541-57.
54Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, 314 U.S. 201, 210 (1941).
"Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric MIg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
"Contrast, however, the analogous provision in Article II of the Articles of Confederation: "Each state retainsits sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction, and right which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States
in Congress assembled." (emphasis supplied) Crosskey shows that "reserved" was deliberately chosen for the Tenth Amendment in place of "retains" and that insertion in the Amend-
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mean that the states retained all sovereign powers enjoyed by them
under the Articles of Confederation, not vested in the national government, and not prohibited to them by the Constitution. But if Crosskey's
analysis of the Constitution before the amendments is correct, this could
not possibly be the correct interpretation of the Tenth Amendment, because the powers vested in the United States were general and compete,
so that nothing would be left to be retained by the states. Further, there is
the well known fact that no change in the original document was understood to be made by the amendment, which was intended to be only
declaratory.
Here again error is said to have arisen because the clause is interpreted
in light of twentieth instead of eighteenth century word meanings. The
word "delegated," Crosskey states, was used in the sense of "absolutely
parted with" or "vested exclusively in," a usage then common though
obsolete today. "Reserved" was employed in the technical legal sense of
the creation of a new interest never previously existing as such, as the
reservation of a right of way in connection with the transfer of a fee simple
estate. In other words, all the powers of government were transferred to
the national government; from this grant certain powers were created
de novo in the "states." The phrase "or to the people" is used in apposition
to "states." Modernized, the clause would read: "The powers not vested
exclusively in the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it
to the state governments are reserved to the people of the states."
Crosskey's views accord with those of James Kent, one of the leading
7
early American law commentators, and Joseph Story. Except to the
extent that the national powers were made exclusive and except for various express prohibitions, the state powers were not blotted out. The states
were subordinated to the national government but a large area of concurrent power was preserved, subject always, however, to the supremacy
of the national government. "So, if the Constitution were allowed to
operate as the instrument was drawn, the American people could, through
Congress, deal with any subject they wished, on a simple, straightforin general,
ward, nationwide basis; and all other subjects, they could,
5' 8
desire.
might
states
the
as
handle
to
states
the
to
leave
ment of the word "expressly" (which then meant "unambiguously and in full detail"), was

three timies voted don, thereby showing that the power of the national government was not
to be limited to the enumerated provisions. C. XXII.
57 Pp. 690-97.
5s P. 1172.
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IV

Crosskey's conception of the intended scheme for administering justice
and the Supreme Court's place in that system differs radically from accepted views. He concludes that the Supreme Court was designed to become the head of a unified national judicial system and that the Court
was never intended to possess a general power to review acts of Congress.
The "new orthodoxy" is that the Supreme Court is supreme over all
courts, federal and state, respecting questions arising under the federal
Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties, but that in the interpretation
of state statutes and the common law, the state courts are supreme. 9 The
Supreme Court has gone so far as to hold that it is constitutionally bound
to follow the precedents on points of state law and common law by state
intermediate appellate courts,60 and even by state trial courts. 61 In subordinating itself to state courts, Crosskey believes that. the Supreme
Court has abdicated its position as a supreme tribunal. He shows:
1) That in'1805, the Supreme Court, in a diversity case, substituted its
own interpretation of a state statute respecting title to real property for
that of a state's highest court, and the Supreme Cburt's construction was
62
thereafter followed.

2) The Supreme Court's opinion in 1812 that there is no federal common law of crimes 63 was the end result of a cleverly contrived series of
maneuvers by the anti-federalists related to the anti-sedition laws. 64
3) That there was a separate system of substantive equity administered
by the federal courts in the early years of the government in which the
federal courts denied substantive rights accorded by the states or granted
substantive rights denied by state law, showing thereby that the federal
65
courts did not follow state law.

Crosskey explains that the Supreme Court was given supreme appellate
jurisdiction over "all" of the law in certain enumerated categories of
cases; that all kinds of questions of law would in the normal course of
events arise in such cases; and that the Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, was to determine supremely and independently all of the
59Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
10 West v. American T. & T. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940).
61 Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940).
"Huidekoper's Lessee v. Douglass, 3 Cranch (U.S.) 1 (1805). For Crosskey's discussion

of the case see C.XXI.
IsUnited States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 7 Cranch (U.S.) 32 (1812).
54 pp. 766-84.
- Pp. 865-902.
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questions in such cases, for if some questions of law in the enumerated
cases could not be determined, the Court could not really decide the
cases. Its rulings were to be binding upon all courts, federal and state.
To illustrate, in a diversity case in a federal district court, there may be
a question respecting the meaning of the Constitution, federal statutes,
treaties, state constitution, state statutes, and state common law. The
Supreme Court was intended to determine as it deemed appropriate the
meaning of a state statute or the state common law rule if the Court chose
to exercise its appellate jurisdiction in a case involving only these or other
questions. If in a subsequent case, a state court in a dispute between two
citizens of the state were to disregard the interpretation of a state statute
by the Supreme Court, the state court's action would present a case
"arising under the Constitution," one of the enumerated categories of
federal jurisdiction. Refusal of the state court to follow the Supreme
Court's precedent, in other words, would raise a question as to what was
meant by giving the Supreme Court its "supreme" "judicial" status and
6
its "appellate jurisdiction" over certain categories of cases.
Crosskey's attack on Erie v. Tompkins" on both historical and prag8
matic grounds is devastating. Were his views accepted there would be
nationwide uniform common law; state statutes would be construed the
same in all courts; and the Supreme Court would have the last word on all
questions of law.
While the Court has failed to exercise the powers it was intended to
enjoy, in asserting a general power to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional, it has exercised authority it was never intended to possess. The
Court, he concludes, was intended to have authority to set aside all state
statutes conflicting with the Constitution, but only such acts of Congress
as invaded the duties confided to the judicial department by the Constitution. 9 Thus, the Court could declare unconstitutional an act of Congress
abolishing trial by jury in criminal cases but not a congressional ex post
facto statute. The judiciary article and those sections of the Bill of Rights
which relate primarily to activities of courts were the only provisions as
to which the Court was to be free to disregard acts of Congress. In all other
cases, the Court was to enforce the statute, even though the Court itself
might deem the act forbidden by the Constitution. Crosskey shows that
when the federal convention met there was not a single instance in which
"Crosskey adumbrates the manner in which the Supreme Court would enforce its precedents against state courts in c. XXI.
67304 U.S. 64 (1938).
6
9Pp. 1002-7.
68 Pp. 916-34.
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any American court had openly or successfully reversed a legislature's
determination as to the nature of its powers, where the Court's own
powers were not in issue. He has examined in detail every instance
of
alleged pre-convention judicial review.7 0 The draftsmanship of the Constitution does not support the conclusion that the Court was intended
to
be vested with a general power of judicial review. 7' Indeed, as Crosskey
points out, the structure of the Court militates against the conclusion
that it was to protect the states against the national government. Thus,
the number of Justices is not fixed by the Constitution so that the President and the Senate, the very agencies to be supervised, can obtain
desired decisions by "packing" the Court. The Constitution does not
provide that the Congress or the states shall be parties to a case in which
a statute is challenged as invading state prerogatives and no time
is
fixed for promptly deciding such disputes-curious lacunae if protection
of state rights was intended. Finally, the chief purpose for judicial
review disappears if the powers of the national government are general
and not limited.
Crosskey undermines completely the belief that general judicial review
was a widely accepted or intended institution when the Constitution was
72

adopted. Each branch of the government, he states, was intended to be
7

OC.

XXVIII.

71Four clauses are traditionally relied upon to support the power
of the Supreme Court to

invalidate acts of Congress: (a) The grant of judicialpower in Article 3. But
this assumes that
judicial power was generally understood in 1787 to include judicial review,
a thesis Crosskey
disproves, c. XXVII. (b) The provision in Article 3, § 2, that judicial power
shall extend to
"all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution.. . ." But
this begs the quesion; the court could decide questions arising "under [the] Constitution"
without declaring
acts of Congress unconstitutional. (c) The oath to support the
Constitution taken
by the justices. This also begs the question, since all executive
and legislative officials take the oath, yet judicial review is not an incident of
their offices. The
oath to support the Constitution does not include a duty of judicial review
unless that duty is
part of the Constitution. (d) The Supremacy Clause, Article 6, which
provides that "This
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof
shall be the supreme Law of the Land." "In pursuance of" in this clause
is usually thought to
mean "consistently with" so that statutes inconsistent with the document
are deemed unconstitutional. Crosskey shows that "in pursuance of" was used in the sense of
"in consequence of"
or "in prosecution of." The Supremacy Clause, in other words, was designed
to
temporal distinction between "this Constitution" and the Articles of Confederation, make a
and between "Laws which shall be made" and Laws already passed by the Continental
Congress and
the Common Law. Only "this Constitution" and future-made laws were
given a supremacy
status. That review of state legislation but not of Acts of Congress was intended
is confirmed
by the provision in the Supremacy Clause that "the Judges in every State
shall be bound" by
the Constitution, notwithstanding "any Thing ...to the Contrary" in
a state constitution
or a state statute, while the Supreme Court and other federal courts were
not declared similarly bound by the Constitution "anything in the Acts of Congress to the
contrary notwithstanding." C. XXVIII.
72For his discussion of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (U.S. )137 (1803),
the first case to
declare an act of Congress unconstitutional, see pp. 1035-46.
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the judge of its own powers. If Congress transgressed one of its limitations,
the people, not the courts, were to provide the check.
V
Crosskey throws new light on the intended relationship of government
to civil rights. He has reconstructed the various stages in the draftsmanship of the Bill of Rights, and he concludes that except for the First
Amendment, which is addressed in terms to Congress, and the appeals
clause of the Seventh Amendment, limited in terms to Courts of the United
States, the first eight amendments were originally intended to apply both
to the states and the nation.73 Because of state-supported religious establishments in New England and the still-fresh memories of Shays' Rebellion
and other disturbances, the First Amendment was made applicable to
Congress only. But Congress was not prohibited from forbidding infringement by the states of the free exercise of religion or free speech.
74
In 1833 the Supreme Court held in Barron v. Baltimore, incorrectly in
Crosskey's view, that the first eight amendments did not apply to the
75
states. The purport of the Dred Scott decision in 1857, which held that
Negroes could not be citizens of the United States, was that Negroes
could enjoy no "privileges or immunities" whatever under the Constitution. These two cases were the relevant standing law when the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted. In providing that "All persons born or
naturalized in the United States ...are citizens of the United States,"
the amendment overruled Dred Scott. But under Barron v. Baltimore, the
states remained free to infringe all of the rights of the newly-liberated
Negroes covered by the first eight amendments. The provision in the
Fourteenth amendment that "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States" was intended, in Crosskey's view, to make good as against the
states the Bill of Rights in favor of all citizens, Negro and white. In short
the Privileges and Immunities Clause overruled Barron v. Baltimore and
Dred Scott.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended in his view to correct a deficiency in the so-called interstate
76
Privileges and Immunities Clause in Article 4 of the Constitution. Each
73Pp. 1056-82.
747 Pet. (U.S.) 243 (1833).

76Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. (U.S.) 393 (1857).
76Art. 4, § 2: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities
of Citizens in the Several States."
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state was required pursuant to that clause to accord citizens of another
state the same general privileges accorded its own citizens as a group, but
a state was free to create inequities among its own citizens. 7 The new
Negro citizens would have been unprotected against various discriminatory state laws. The Equal Protection Clause was intended to supplement
the interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause by destroying this power.7 8 The clause is primarily designed to insure to each individual the
right to have each state's law enforcement machinery as available in defense of his interests as in behalf of any other individual.
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person may be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment made this prohibition
good as against the states in favor of citizens. The Due Process Clause in
the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to make good in favor of "any
person," citizen or alien, the process guaranties of the Bill of Rights.79
The tests of "dueness," i.e., propriety of procedure, under the two Due
Process Clauses, according to Crosskey, are threefold: (1) Is the procedure
unforbidden by the Constitution? (2) If unforbidden, is it supported by
applicable, i.e., 1787, common law precedents? (3) If not forbidden by the
Constitution and not supported by common law precedent, is the proce80
dure fair and reasonable?
Crosskey's views differ substantially from the doctrines now held by
the Supreme Court. The Court gives virtually no force to the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of the amendment; in effect, that clause is a dead
letter.8" Some but not all the provisions of the Bill of Rights have been
incorporated into the Due Process Clause and thereby made good as
against the states.8 2 Procedural and substantive rights have been subsumed indiscriminately. The Equal Protection Clause is deemed to be a
license to review the reasonableness of state legislative classifications of,
all kinds.
Crosskey is the first writer to piece together the much-mooted Four"7Pp. 1096-97.
78Pp. 1090-1102.
79 Pp. 1102-10, 1116-18.
0

8

Ibid.

" See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160,181 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring).
"2See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,323 (1937); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46
(1947). The most important right not "incorporated" is the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of
the assistance of counsel in state criminal, non-capital cases.
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teenth Amendment as a symmetrical, logical whole and to account for the
relationship of all its various provisions to the antecedent law.
VI
Apart from its intrinsic importance as a contribution to American
history, what difference does Crosskey's work make? Doctrinally
Crosskey and the Supreme Court are far apart; but the end results are in
many cases the same. Acceptance of Crosskey's views would, however,
obliterate a great many useless technicalities; it would vastly simplify our
law and government. The Commerce Clause, for example, has been
interpreted by the Supreme Court to cover nearly all of the nation's
business. Straightforward recognition that the clause comprehended all
gainful activity among the people of the states would not, therefore, be a
radical innovation, and yet it would close a troublesome gap which
produces endless jurisdictional strife and which prevents badly needed
unification of the nation's commercial law. Similarly, Crosskey's interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause would not touch off violent
controversy if accepted; to the contrary, uniform conflict of laws rules
would be welcomed in most quarters as a means of eliminating needless
legal complexity. Other views advanced by Crosskey-his theory of
judicial review and his interpretation of the Imports and Exports and
the Contracts Clauses, for example-would not find ready acceptance.
In one sense, it is true, as Hughes observed, that "the Constitution is
' But historical research has not been without
what the judges say it is." 83
effect upon the Supreme Court. Charles Warren's investigation into the
historical meaning of the judiciary article8 4 influenced the decision
in Erie v. Tompkins,85 when the Supreme Court confessed that it had
been acting unconstitutionally for ninety-six years. Only recently, the
Court deferred decision in the school segregation cases pending research
86
into the historical meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. If he has
done nothing else, Crosskey has demonstrated that many of the anachronistic doctrines of the Supreme Court are not legally and logically compelled by the words of the Constitution itself. It is a striking paradox that
the historical meaning should be shown to permit a more flexible, simpler
83 Justice Frankfurter has reminded us, however, that the constitutional document, and
not the decisions of the Court, is the "ultimate touchstone of constitutionality." Graves v.
O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939).
84
Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 Harv. L.
Rev. 49 (1923).
- 304U.S. 64, 72-73 (1938).
5Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 345 U.S. 972 (1953).
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scheme of government than that which has resulted from viewing the
Constitution as a "living document."
Because he so searchingly questions so many deeply felt beliefs, accepted institutions, and historical heroes, Crosskey's views are certain to
encounter great resistance. His refusal to accept authority and repetition
as the test of the truth and his insistence upon reexamining accepted
premises are in the best tradition of scientific inquiry. Politics and the
Constitution warrants wide and thoughtful attention. It may have a
profound and lasting impact on American law.

